Ten years after the Brexit referendum, the European issue has re-entered the British political debate. While accepting the Trade and Cooperation Agreement signed by Boris Johnson and pledging to keep to ‘red lines’ about the single market and the customs union, the Labour Party promised a ‘reset’ with the EU in its 2024 manifesto. Since then, the Starmer government has acknowledged the domestic economic costs of Brexit and pursued more cooperation with the EU. The first UK/EU summit, which took place in London in May 2025, included plans for a SPS agreement to ease cross-border trade, the linking of the UK and EU emissions trading systems, and a youth mobility scheme. In the months that followed, negotiations opened in Brussels, but progress has proved slow and difficult, with few tangible deals so far except on Britain rejoining the EU Erasmus+ programme.
Discussions about the ‘reset’ in the UK have tended to be inward-looking, focusing on what public opinion, Reform UK or indeed Labour Party members would wish for the future. There have also been debates about the merits of rejoining the customs union, creating a customs union, rejoining the single market or developing a Swiss-style model of bespoke bilateral agreements with the EU. But with a few exceptions, there has been a limited recognition of the priorities and constraints which affect the EU and its member states when they discuss the future of UK/EU cooperation. An understanding of these positions is necessary, and this paper seeks to analyse the position of France, a member-state with a long history of bilateral relations with Britain and also a country often deemed to have adopted a tough line in negotiations with London after 2016.1
Discussions about the ‘reset’ in the UK have tended to be inward-looking, focusing on what public opinion, Reform UK or indeed Labour Party members would wish for the future. But with a few exceptions, there has been a limited recognition of the priorities and constraints which affect the EU and its member states when they discuss the future of UK/EU cooperation.
A long history of Franco-British relations
Friendship and rivalry have alternated in the long history of Franco-British relations.2 France and the UK made (at least partly) different choices to mitigate the adverse effects of their relative decline after 1945. The UK chose a strategic partnership with the USA and, at first, supported the idea of cooperation in Europe and free trade but chose to stay out of the integration process. Instead, the governments of the Fourth and Fifth Republics in France took the lead in what became the European Community, seeing leadership in Europe as the best way to maintain its status on the world scene.3 The French attitude towards the US was also traditionally more ambiguous, with French presidents maintaining distance, though not equidistance, between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. France left NATO’s military command structure in 1966 and only rejoined it in 2009, under President Nicolas Sarkozy. This strategic divergence was illustrated by Britain’s late entry into the European Community following De Gaulle’s two vetoes of 1963 and 1967, while Britain’s transactional approach to membership after it finally joined in January 1973 continued to clash with France’s aspirations to construct an economic and political union within the EC/EU.
Yet this difference did not prevent bilateral relations from flourishing from the 1970s onwards, with joint grands projets like the Concord(e) and the Channel Tunnel, which opened in 1994 and led to a dramatic increase in cross-Channel crossings and trade. Moreover, the two countries developed wide-ranging cooperation on security and defence issues in Europe after the end of the Cold War, leading first to the 1998 Saint-Malo agreement between Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac and then the 2010 Lancaster House agreements signed by Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron. The latter provided for the creation of a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), interoperability of aircraft carriers, as well as cooperation on defence procurement and nuclear testing.
France in the Brexit negotiations
In this context, the Brexit referendum result caused a shock not just to the EU as a whole, but also to the bilateral relationship.4 France’s immediate reaction, in spite of the close bilateral relationship with the UK, was to regret the outcome of the referendum and to protect the EU, which at the time was seen as risking disintegration. The fear that there would be a domino effect following the Brexit vote was high across the EU, including in France where euroscepticism had been on the rise, as evidenced by the negative result of the 2005 referendum on the European constitution. This explains why then-President François Hollande insisted in October 2016 that there should be ‘a price’ to pay to leave the EU; otherwise, he argued, the whole European project would be undermined. After he was elected in May 2017, Emmanuel Macron maintained the same line that there is an essential distinction between being a member state and being a third country. This came as a surprise to British officials, who had expected their hitherto close partner to be more accommodating.
During the Brexit negotiations, between 2017 and 2020, France was portrayed as a tough negotiator: rejecting any compromise with the UK on the integrity of the single market and any British attempt to ‘cherry-pick’ some aspects of it without also accepting, in particular, the free circulation of people. The fact that the head of the European Commission taskforce, Michel Barnier, was French reinforced the perception of French hostility in London. In his account of Theresa May’s years as Prime Minister, Anthony Seldon writes of Macron as “a constant thorn agitating the EU to stand up to Britain over Brexit”.5 Indeed the Paris government appeared again on different occasions as a more vocal and intransigent negotiator than others in the EU, although the EU was actually united behind the task force.
Tensions between the two countries certainly escalated under Boris Johnson over a number of issues. One was fisheries, which affected many French coastal constituencies and was politically sensitive in Paris. An agreement was found in 2020 to continue to give access to EU fishing vessels in British waters after Brexit, but British authorities denied French trawlers 33 fishing licences off the coast of Jersey in 2021. After French sailors blocked the port of Jersey in November, a new agreement was finally reached, with 80 additional licences granted.
Cross-Channel irregular migration also proved a highly contentious issue, with a crisis erupting between London and Paris in November 2021 when 21 migrants drowned in the Channel, prompting angry recriminations between officials. Finally, the nadir in bilateral relations was reached in the same year when the UK, US and Australia announced a new security partnership, AUKUS, which they had negotiated secretly, leading Australia to abruptly cancel a previous contract with France to provide it with submarines. This period culminated in Liz Truss’s infamous comment at the Conservative leadership hustings that “the jury is out” on whether President Macron was “friend or foe?” in August 2022.
While regretting Brexit, the Macron government was also eager to use the opportunity provided by the British withdrawal to push forward a long-standing aim of French diplomacy, which the president called European strategic autonomy in a speech to the Sorbonne in 2017.6 The concept had actually been part of French doctrine since the 1994 White Paper on defence but became central to Macron’s foreign policy and clashed with the May and Johnson visions of post-Brexit Global Britain. It involved strengthening the European capacity to act autonomously in an increasing number of fields. While originally focused on defence and security, the concept now also covers mitigating the risks of dependence on foreign supply chains and energy, while also protecting and defending European values. The war in Ukraine and the re-election of Donald Trump as US President also reinforced the French push for more EU military and procurement autonomy vis-à-vis the US. This was not directly an impediment to bilateral cooperation with the UK but signalled a shift in priorities in the defence field .
The Macron government was eager to use the opportunity provided by Brexit to push forward a long-standing aim of French diplomacy – European strategic autonomy. It involved strengthening the European capacity to act autonomously in an increasing number of fields.
France and the reset
The French government welcomed the ‘reset’ with the EU promised by the Labour party in opposition, even though bilateral relations had already improved by the time the party came to power in July 2024. The signing of the Windsor Framework by PM Rishi Sunak in February 2023 was crucial in that regard, as it contributed to restoring some trust between the EU and the UK and therefore also between individual member states and the British government. It paved the way for the first Franco-British summit since 2018, held in Paris in March 2023, which unlocked bilateral cooperation in several fields including immigration, energy and defence.7 It was followed by a visit by King Charles III to Paris in September 2023.
In this context, Starmer’s ‘reset’ was seen in Paris as a positive contribution to European security. Another bilateral summit took place in London in July 2025, only a few weeks after the May UK/EU summit which agreed the extension of the 2020 fisheries agreement, guaranteeing continued access to British waters for French (and other European) fishing vessels until 2038. The bilateral summit covered a wide array of issues, from immigration to energy and culture. On defence, the two countries pledged to update the Lancaster House agreements (2.0) by deepening nuclear cooperation, increasing industrial collaboration on procurement and transforming the temporary expeditionary CJEF into the Combined Joint Force, a corps-level multi-domain permanent force.
France and Britain have also cooperated closely on Ukraine, jointly leading the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’, established in March 2025, which is working on a possible deployment of troops on the ground if a ceasefire is reached. Planning sessions have since taken place at the official and military levels, with a multinational command headquarters based in Paris and then rotating to London. Although this initiative is heavily dependent on an end to the war and Russia agreeing to the deployment and is therefore somewhat hypothetical, it is a sign of the two countries’ readiness to work together and signal that they remain the two leading military powers on the continent.
Yet since the 2024 general election, French officials have voiced concern that the British government has not articulated clearly its long-term objectives and that its new EU policy lacked substance. The British government’s insistence on its ‘red lines’ over not rejoining the customs union or single market also puzzled French officials. For its part, the British government has continued to perceive the different French governments which followed the failed snap legislative elections in July 2024 (by then political instability had reached France) as pushing for a hard stance towards British attempts to increase cooperation. This tension was most acute in November 2025, when the UK and EU failed to reach an agreement on British participation in the EU Security Action for Europe (SAFE) scheme for joint borrowing for armaments procurement over the €6 billion fee Britain was asked to pay to secure access for UK firms. Although French officials were keen to point out that it had been a figure advanced by the Commission without input from the member states, it remained true that France was not particularly keen to have British companies competing with its own defence industry in getting access to these loans .
French officials have voiced concern that the British government has not articulated clearly its long-term objectives and that its new EU policy lacked substance. The British government’s insistence on its ‘red lines’ over not rejoining the customs union or single market also puzzled French officials.
The limits of the reset
The view in Paris is that the UK should not be able to enjoy the benefits provided by the EU without the constraints involved in membership. It is a matter of principle, but, again, also seen as a deterrent to other third countries which might be tempted to demand similar arrangements. The financial dimension of British participation in EU programmes is an important factor affecting the EU in general, and particularly France. In practice, this entails not just that the UK should contribute to specific programmes that it wishes to join, such as Horizon Europe or Erasmus+, but extends to paying into the overall EU budget, especially structural funds. There are nevertheless differences on this issue among EU member states, with some countries, including Germany and the Netherlands, apparently readier to compromise on this than France.8 For French officials, this is a core issue where Britain needs to be more flexible.
Beyond the specific issue of funding, an enduring suspicion remains in France that the British government has not given up on ‘cherry-picking’ and is keen to choose some aspects of the single market – such as trade for goods – while imposing red lines on others like free movement of people. Government officials fear that the British are attempting to bypass the single market rules by trying to negotiate a bespoke agreement, as Theresa May attempted to do between 2017 and 2018. They are wary of what they see as a purely transactional approach to the EU by the Starmer government, exemplified by Minister for EU relations Nick Thomas-Symonds’ claim of being “ruthlessly pragmatic” in his dealings with the continent.9 This lack of ‘vision’ about European unity as a common good remains an obstacle to a full rapprochement for Paris.
The British side should also not underestimate the fact that the UK is no longer a priority for France within the EU. Ten years after the Brexit referendum and five years after Britain actually left it, the EU is focused on other issues than its relations with the UK. The war in Ukraine, the COVID crisis and the re-election of Donald Trump have changed the conversation within EU institutions. France is now focused on the negotiation for the forthcoming Multiannual Financial Framework, the debate on enlargement to the Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova, the ‘European preference’ in areas like AI and the implementation of the Draghi report on EU competitiveness. In domestic terms, President Macron’s priority is to thwart the rise of the Rassemblement National in the run-up to the 2027 presidential elections.
Finally, French officials are fully aware of the British domestic political situation, including the historical strength of euroscepticism, the instability in British governments since 2016 and the electoral threat of Reform UK. No major change in EU/UK relations can be contemplated without a degree of trust in the continuity of British policy towards Europe and therefore a degree of domestic consensus over its medium and long-term European strategy. In the French view, there is no point negotiating a new settlement with the UK which risks being unravelled under a future British government dominated by Reform or the Conservative Party.
No major change in EU/UK relations can be contemplated without a degree of trust in the continuity of British policy towards Europe and therefore a degree of domestic consensus over its medium and long-term European strategy.
Conclusion
Franco-British relations have markedly improved since 2023, with the bilateral progress stemming from the Windsor Framework continuing alongside the broader ‘reset’ between the UK and the EU. But progress remains incremental, limited by the ‘red lines’ put forward by the Labour Party in 2024 and maintained by the Starmer government. The Macron government is also concerned that the UK continues to aim to “cherry-pick” some aspects of the single market while rejecting other parts, such as free movement of people. France would not welcome an attempt to adopt the Swiss model for UK/EU relations, with endless negotiations on a multitude of bilateral agreements giving Britain access to parts of the single market. Furthermore, despite close cooperation between the two countries on Ukraine and more recently over the Strait of Hormuz, France continues to prioritise its ‘strategic autonomy’ objective for the EU in its approach to UK/EU cooperation whilst feeling that the Labour government continues to prioritise transatlantic links when it comes to ensuring European security, in line with its ‘NATO-first’ strategy as set out in the 2025 Strategic Defence Review. Most of all, the lack of a clear long-term vision of EU/UK relations in London, based on a domestic consensus, prevents France from warmly embracing British attempts to rejoin some EU programmes.
1. Victor Mallet and Alex Barker, ‘Macron plays bad cop to Merkel’s good cop on Brexit’, Financial Times, 11 April 2019.
2. Robert Tombs and Isabelle Tombs, That Sweet Enemy: Britain and France: The History of a Love-Hate Relationship. London: Pimlico, 2007.
3. Frédéric Bozo, La politique étrangère de la France depuis 1945, Paris, Flammarion, 2012.
4. Helen Drake and Pauline Schnapper, ‘”We Thought We Were Friends!”: Franco-British Bilateral Diplomacy and the Shock of Brexit’, Journal of Contemporary European Research, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2021, pp. 482-499.
5. Anthony Seldon, May at Ten, London, Biteback Publishing, p. 631.
6. Emmanuel Macron, ‘Initiative pour l’Europe’, speech to the Sorbonne, 26 September 2017, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/09/26/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-emmanuel-macron-pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique.
7. See ‘UK-France Joint Leaders’ Declaration’, 10 March 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-france-joint-leaders-declaration/uk-france-joint-leaders-declaration.
8. ‘Brussels deadlocked about how to handle Brexit Britain’, Politico, 12 November 2025.
9. Nick Thomas-Symonds, speech at the College of Europe, 16 September 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/minister-for-european-union-relations-speech-at-college-of-europe.
