Sudan is in the news these days, and rightly so, as its current senseless and brutal conflict reaches its third anniversary. However, its neighbour South Sudan, which seems to have largely disappeared from international public consciousness, is also deserving of urgent attention as an ongoing low-level conflict threatens to break out into full scale civil war again.
In July 2011, I joined the people of South Sudan in celebrating their independence from Sudan after a 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement ended a twenty-two-year civil war, which itself was only the latest phase of seventy years of armed liberation struggle. This was followed by a six-year interim period to “give unity a chance” and a referendum in which the population voted overwhelmingly for secession. It was a day of joy, hope and expectation for a new dispensation free from what was often likened to apartheid and colonial rule by successive regimes in Khartoum, many of them Islamist military dictatorships intent on Arabisation and Islamisation.
Just over two years later in December 2013, I found myself dodging gunfire and street fighting as I drove around South Sudan’s capital helping the Church leaders to coordinate a message calling for peace in a brand-new civil war. President Salva Kiir had earlier dismissed Vice President Riek Machar, and in a high-level meeting of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) Kiir was perceived as establishing policies further disadvantaging Machar and his faction. The Catholic and Anglican archbishops had together met the president and urged him to postpone the meeting in order to defuse tensions, but to no avail. Fighting broke out pitting Dinka soldiers loyal to Kiir against Nuer followers of Machar. Many Nuer civilians were massacred and fighting and tit-for-tat massacres of civilians spread to other parts of the country. Church leaders not only called for peace but begged people not to turn this into an ethnic conflict. Sadly, their plea was not heeded.
In 2015 an Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) was signed between the SPLM in Government (SPLM-IG) and SPLM in Opposition (SPLM-IO), represented by Kiir and Machar respectively. A power-sharing transitional government of national unity was formed, and Machar returned to Juba as Vice President. Only a year later, in 2016, I once again found myself in the thick of urban warfare as artillery and helicopter gunships pounded the positions of Machar’s supporters. He fled on foot to DRC. In 2018 a Revitalised ARCSS (R-ARCSS) was signed, a new transitional government was formed, Machar again returned to Juba as First Vice President, this time with several other vice-presidents representing other armed factions. The government has failed to implement most of the required conditions of the R-ARCSS and has merely used the agreement as a means to legitimise the SPLM in government and to remain in power.
The government of South Sudan has been described as a “kleptocracy”1. Local people often refer to it as “looting sharing” rather than “power sharing” as the political and military elite enrich themselves at the expense of the nation. The SPLM-IG seeks to crush opposition through its military and state security apparatus, but it also offers incentives for its opponents to be co-opted; more than one small local rebel movement has managed to get its leaders integrated into an ever-expanding government in return for ceasing its operations, and South Sudan’s current five vice-presidents are part of this dynamic. The president’s dominant SPLM-IG has also sought to undermine the R-ARCSS by luring members of other parties to defect to its ranks, thus upsetting the balance within the government and going against the spirit of the agreement. Meanwhile all parties continue to recruit militias. A number of small rebel groups refused to sign the agreement, believing it to be a sham, and low-level insurgencies have continued unabated.
“The government has failed to implement most of the required conditions of the R-ARCSS and has merely used the agreement as a means to legitimise the SPLM in government and to remain in power.”
The R-ARCSS was arguably the best agreement that could be achieved at the time, and it reduced the level of conflict, but it was designed to produce an elected government after two years. It has singularly failed to do so. There have been two two-year extensions as the government has made no serious effort to begin the process of holding elections nor to integrate the various armed groups into a single national army. No agreement, however promising on paper, can succeed if the signatories have no intention of implementing it. It’s surely time to admit that the R-ARCSS is no longer fit for purpose (if it ever was) and a new dispensation is needed.
In 2025 President Kiir dismissed Machar from the government and placed him under house arrest, thus effectively abrogating the R-ARCSS in all but name. Fighting took place between armed groups of Nuer in Jonglei State, loosely affiliated with Machar, and the mainly Dinka forces of Kiir’s government, but at that point the opposition was neither strong enough nor united enough to mount a full-scale challenge. The government response was a swift and brutal offensive, including indiscriminate aerial bombardment, much of it against civilians, with military assistance from Uganda; the fighting continues to escalate. Machar is currently on trial, charged with murder, treason and crimes against humanity.
The Economist recently published an article entitled “The last days of Salva Kiir”2, noting that “As the president’s regime unravels, it is taking the country down with it”. I’ve always had great respect for Salva Kiir ever since I first met him in his military HQ in Yei more than a quarter of a century ago when he was still Dr John Garang’s second in command during the liberation war. He was very supportive of Church-led peace processes, and we found him to be a good listener. Church leaders felt he was a good man trying to do a very difficult (if not impossible) task, balancing opposing agendas and factions. It saddens me to see his decline. It is doubtful whether Kiir is still anything more than a figurehead being manipulated by various interests. These include his own clan and family, and some of the many security and businesspeople who surround him, although the notorious Jieng (Dinka) Council of Elders, a self-appointed and once influential group of Dinka elder (and often failed) statesmen reportedly has less influence these days. Some of Kiir’s behaviour is bizarre, epitomised by his January 2026 appointment to a senior position of someone who had been dead for five years3.
“No agreement, however promising on paper, can succeed if the signatories have no intention of implementing it. It’s surely time to admit that the R-ARCSS is no longer fit for purpose (if it ever was) and a new dispensation is needed.”
The economy is in tatters, insecurity is rife, civic space is rapidly shrinking, security organs act with impunity, the humanitarian catastrophe is massive4, and as funds dry up a kleptocracy held together only by Kiir’s ability to distribute largesse is falling apart. There are serious concerns about his health and his alcoholism, but there is no succession plan in place. SPLM heavyweights have gradually been sidelined and when either death or incapacity removes him from office there will likely be a violent power struggle to fill the vacuum. In 2025 there was speculation that a little known but powerful businessman, Benjamin Bol Mel, who had certainly helped to line Kiir’s family’s pockets, was being groomed to replace him, but he soon fell out of favour and in any case would probably have had little chance of surviving without any strong support base of his own. Kiir’s daughter Adut Salva is currently being mentioned as a potential power broker for the presidency, but who knows?
South Sudan will never be at peace until the voices of the ordinary people are heard above the clamour of the elites, and the root causes of the conflicts are honestly addressed. These include the corruption, nepotism and entitlement not uncommon with military liberation movements which may start out with good intentions but which, after achieving their stated goals, soon claim that they alone brought about liberation and therefore they deserve to reap the spoils of victory.
But there are deeper problems, internal conflicts and tensions which have never been addressed. South Sudanese achieved a degree of unity during their liberation struggle through a negative identity – “we are not Arab, not Muslim, not northern Sudanese” – but they had never articulated a positive national identity of who they actually are. There are also tribal tensions, which are very complex. Many South Sudanese communities have lived peacefully side by side, intermarried and cooperated for much of history. Traditionally there was tension between transhumant Nilotic pastoralists and sedentary Equatorian agriculturalists which surfaced politically in 1983 when then President Nimeiri abrogated the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement which had ended the first civil war. The current conflict between Dinka and Nuer dates back to a 1991 split in the SPLM which resulted in massacres of civilians on both sides and has resurfaced since then with the rivalry between Kiir and Machar. In the past there were traditional local mechanisms in place to deal with these types of tensions and conflicts, but nowadays opportunist politicians capitalise on and exacerbate them.
In both the old Sudan and the new South Sudan there is a huge divide between the centre and the periphery of the nation. The national government impinges little on the people at the periphery, except when it sends soldiers or recruiters to harass them. It is unable to provide either security or basic services, and people rely on their local traditional leaders, often with associated militia or self-defence groups, as well as their own resources. Dr John Garang famously called for a policy of “taking the town to the villages”, a development strategy intended to decentralise services, infrastructure and development to rural areas, thus discouraging people from migrating to overcrowded urban slums. It aimed to provide rural job opportunities, food security and essential services like healthcare, education, roads and electricity directly to rural populations. Sadly this vision died with him in his 2005 helicopter crash and his successors have if anything done the opposite. International donors have colluded with this by focusing on national institutions rather than reaching the people where they are. I remember twenty-odd years ago accompanying the late Bishop Paride Taban to a meeting with a British Ambassador who was gung-ho for national institutions and was rather shocked when the bishop disillusioned him, prophetically informing him that, while we are not against national institutions and recognise that they have their place, they are not the primary solution to the ills of South Sudan.
From the mid-1990s until the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2005 the Christian Church, in its ecumenical form with all major denominations working together, played a huge role in bringing peace, both at the national level and between South Sudanese. In much of the Global North the Church is often viewed as reactionary, irrelevant, out of date, out of touch, fundamentalist, obscenely wealthy, obsessed with sexual morality, and riven by scandal. While much of this may at times be true, a rigid separation of religion and state hinders many people’s understanding of the Church and fosters misconceptions; the Church is often seen as a problem. But in Sudan the Church has played a unique role far beyond its “religious” calling. The Church was the only institution that retained its infrastructure and remained present on the ground amongst the people everywhere throughout the 1983-2005 civil war. There was often no government, no civil society, no media, no NGOs and UN, and even the role of the traditional leadership was badly eroded by the young comrades with guns, but Church personnel, programmes and structures endured. In many ways the Church inherited the role of government, providing basic human and social services such as health, education, water and emergency relief, and even protection; not with guns, but the presence of the Church often moderated the actions of the warring parties. The Church was also involved in conflict resolution and peacebuilding between communities on the ground, as well as civic education and international advocacy for peace. People looked to the Church for leadership and guidance; not only Christians, but Muslims and followers of African traditional religion too. Thus the Church in Sudan, as in many countries in Africa and other parts of the world where poverty, conflict, political oppression, social inequality and underdevelopment are rife, is widely experienced as a force for good, a progressive influence, in the forefront of the struggle for justice, peace, human rights and democracy.
Dr John Garang’s vision of development, “taking the town to the villages” to provide rural job opportunities, food security and essential services died with him in 2005. His successors have, if anything, done the opposite. International donors have colluded with this by focusing on national institutions rather than reaching the people where they are.
For all these reasons the Church gained remarkable credibility and moral authority. It has played a crucial role in the life of the nation and this public role is continuing in South Sudan. When civil war broke out again at the end of 2013, people quickly turned to the Church to help bring peace. However, the decades of war and oppression before the independence of South Sudan had taken their toll, and churches were busy recovering, recuperating and rebuilding; regaining their peacebuilding capacity was now a slow and at times painful challenge. But by 2015 we were able to travel to Addis Ababa to meet Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn, a key peace ally at the time, and we held a retreat for Church leaders in Kigali. Moved by the experiences of Rwandans during and after their genocide, our Church leaders determined to play their part and instituted an “Action Plan for Peace” (APP), drawing heavily on our previous experience of peacebuilding. The APP has had many successes at the local level, transforming conflict and reconciling communities, but has so far failed to make an impact at the national level. As civic space shrinks under increasingly aggressive security organs the Church still has a little more room to manoeuvre than the rest of civil society, but the political and military leaders remain intransigent. Even Pope Francis’ unprecedented symbolic act of kissing the feet of the South Sudanese political leaders during a spiritual retreat in Rome in 2019 failed to move them, despite Kiir’s reflection that “I was shocked and trembled when His Holiness the Pope kissed our feet. It was a blessing and can be a curse if we play games with the lives of our people”.
As I write for a UK journal, what can I say to the leaders and the people of my native isle? Firstly, one has to deplore the recent cuts in UK overseas aid. No longer can we hold our heads up high as one of the few countries in the world meeting the UN target of 0.7% of GNP. This shameful cut, continued by a Labour government no less, is morally wrong and is only increasing the hardships of people in South Sudan and many other countries. If it is intended to enhance UK security, it is short-sighted and misguided. Our security does not come from weapons but from international multilateralism and global justice, equality and prosperity. UK aid agencies assisting the people of South Sudan include Christian Aid, CAFOD, Oxfam and many others, while successive Archbishops of Canterbury have visited South Sudan and supported both peacebuilding and humanitarian aid. Amongst the international donors in South Sudan the UK was highly respected and very influential in setting aid policies. All of these efforts, built up over a long period, are now undermined by the reduction in aid funding.
South Sudan is awash with small arms and light weapons from its previous wars, as well as from neighbours such as Sudan, Uganda and Somalia. But nevertheless, a serious arms embargo on all belligerent parties in South Sudan is essential. One can never really prevent pastoralists from seeking arms to protect their livestock, but heavier weapons such as artillery, helicopter gunships, drones, bombs and attack aircraft need to be stopped.
“Amongst the international donors in South Sudan the UK was highly respected and very influential in setting aid policies. All of these efforts, built up over a long period, are now undermined by the reduction in aid funding.”
Sanctions worked against apartheid in South Africa, but even targeted sanctions against individuals have limited impact in South Sudan. As SPLM-IO Commander Peter Gadet famously asked, “How many cattle do I have in New York?” – his personal wealth is on the hoof, guarded by well-armed militia and unaffected by international sanctions. The political and military elite are living very comfortably, with their families often staying abroad and their children in elite schools and universities, driving top of the range cars. Many of them are dual citizens of western nations. South Sudanese money is being laundered all over the world, not least in neighbouring Kenya, and until the international community addresses this cash flow the leaders have no incentive to change the status quo. There are international groups such as The Sentry5 investigating money laundering routes and making hard evidence available, but is there any international will to address it through the banking and financial institutions? Not unconnected to this is the illicit flow of minerals and other resources, such as clandestine industrial-scale gold mining along the border with Ethiopia and illegal timber exports through Uganda.
As the former colonial power, the UK has always been involved with the Sudans and can still play a role in bringing peace to South Sudan. But it needs a degree of realism and honesty. More than twenty years ago I peeved a number of ambassadors in Khartoum by telling them, “These people are running rings round you and you’re not even aware of it!” and I could probably say the same to many diplomats in Juba today. The leaders of South Sudan have no intention of implementing the R-ARCSS, so why does the international community continue to act as if they do? Key actors such as the UN, the African Union, the European Union, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, USA, UK and Norway need to recognise that a new road map for peace is needed and to use what limited leverage they have with South Sudan’s kleptocracy to explore new options, rather than flogging a dead horse by continually harking back to the R-ARCSS.
While peace negotiations obviously have to include the elite politicians and the people with guns, nevertheless any initiative which seriously aims to provide sustainable justice and peace in South Sudan needs to find creative ways of engaging with the ordinary people, represented perhaps by their chiefs and their Church leaders. One hopeful initiative in this regard was the Peacebuilding Opportunities Fund (POF)6, a UK government funded community-facing programme working with chiefs, armed youth and women leaders which began in 2019. It still continues to some extent through a national peacebuilding organisation, but its budget was cut as part of the FCDO cutbacks, a concrete example of how the UK funding cuts are adversely impacting peace and stability in South Sudan.
“The leaders of South Sudan have no intention of implementing the R-ARCSS, so why does the international community continue to act as if they do? Key actors such as the UN, the African Union, the European Union, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, USA, UK and Norway need to recognise that a new road map for peace is needed”
Finally, in a world where even democratic western nations unfortunately seem to be choosing military options as routine solutions to political tensions, let me emphasise the importance of finding and supporting nonviolent solutions to South Sudan’s problems through dialogue and other avenues. There are growing efforts in peacebuilding circles, using evidence-based research7, to educate populations and their political leaders that active nonviolent resistance not only works but usually produces a more stable, democratic, human rights respecting, law abiding, peaceful and sustainable society than any military “victory”.
A powerful element of active nonviolence is pre-emption. Many areas of South Sudan are already experiencing violence, but the nation is on the brink of descending once again into full-scale civil war. No-one can predict what the trigger will be (the passing of Salva Kiir and the ensuing power vacuum and succession struggle? A guilty verdict against Riek Machar? Something completely unexpected and unpredictable?) nor exactly when, but it’s not too late for the UK and other international actors to step up and engage with honesty and realism in walking with South Sudan on the hard road to peace.
1. De Waal, Alex, “When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of the Civil War in South Sudan”, African Affairs, Vol. 113, No. 452 (July 2014), Oxford University Press.
2 The Economist, February 28th 2026, p44.
3 “Kiir appoints dead man to body tasked with election matters”, Radio Tamazuj, 2 February 2026.
4 “In 2026, more than 10 million people, two-thirds of the population are projected to require some form of humanitarian assistance. The humanitarian situation is characterized by acute food insecurity, widespread displacement, fragile health and education systems, and severe protection risks”, UN OCHA, https://www.unocha.org/south-sudan
5 https://thesentry.org/
6 https://www.pofss.org/
7 Cf Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict by Erica Chenoweth and Maria J Stephan, Columbia University Press, 2011.
