Much has happened since Starmer’s King’s Speech1 on 26 May 2026. On the face of it, that “radical reset” of arrangements governing both civil and military nuclear activities still stands as the basis for Andy Burnham’s own policy direction on these crucial issues. Certainly, this major boost in official commitments to all things nuclear remains evident in the direction taken by Andy Burnham’s early initiative2. Building on the Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce Review3 initiated in 2025, the biggest overhaul of nuclear regulation for decades seems to be ‘full speed ahead’.
But does this renewed momentum make sense, for the most expensive energy on the grid and a military posture that has remained unchanged for decades despite a massively transformed world? What is the evidence underpinning these moves? Where has this been properly interrogated? The Taskforce review is treated as if it has already answered these questions. This briefing will examine whether and to what degree this is so.
Whatever view is taken of nuclear power or nuclear weapons, the major nuclear regulatory reforms now in play are extraordinarily important. Nuclear technologies touch on issues of energy, climate, public spending, environmental protection, health, security and national strategy. If regulation is to be weakened, streamlined or redesigned, all sides might agree that the case for doing so should be rigorous, transparent and evidence-based4.
Accordingly, the stated aims of the Review were to make regulation more efficient, affordable and proportionate. Yet the new nuclear policy is undermined right at the outset by such claims being more assumed than supported by evidence. Indeed, the Taskforce itself says that “[w]e have taken the Government’s commitment to civil and defence nuclear power as given for the purposes of this review”5.
As a result, conclusions are presented as though they are self-evident. Without duly attending to cross-country comparisons6, the UK is asserted to be an “international leader” in nuclear technology7. Existing UK nuclear regulation is likewise said to be “well respected”. But it is not mentioned specifically by whom, nor on what particular grounds, this should be true of a country which has, under any view, slipped far behind others in this field over the past fifty years8. Taking these claims as “given” risks substituting reasoned analysis with nationalistic posturing9.
Nuclear technology is likewise revealingly characterised as a given: as “essential” for national security, energy security and net zero10. Again, detailed evidence for such claims is almost entirely absent. Declared priorities of efficiency, affordability and proportionality are further undermined by failing anywhere in more than 160 pages to substantiate how these values are met by furthering nuclear technologies rather than their many alternatives11. As if nuclear power existed in isolation, the attention is virtually all on this one option alone.
So, it may seem scarcely believable, but is nonetheless true, that the comparative case made by the Taskforce for nuclear power in relation to alternatives is not merely flawed: it is non-existent. Perhaps the reason for this lies in the inconvenience for official interests, of what is an increasingly compelling comparative picture. Despite the official impressions given otherwise, nuclear power is in fact clearly generally more costly12, slower and less effective13 than alternative strategies for economical, secure, firm-equivalent, domestic zero carbon energy14. This is true both internationally15 and even in official UK data16 (on the rare occasions and obscure corners where it is looked at17).
The Taskforce’s conclusions are presented as though they are self-evident: the UK is “international leader” in nuclear technology though it has slipped far behind others in this field over the past fifty years. Taking these claims as “given” risks substituting reasoned analysis with nationalistic posturing.
Nor are these core considerations all that the Taskforce falls short of properly addressing. The Review nowhere refutes that nuclear continues to present disproportionate risks of distinctive low-probability, high-consequence accidents18, yet seemingly does not consider this an issue of importance warranting further discussion. Likewise neglected is a scientific literature increasingly pointing to locally elevated health problems around nuclear facilities19. Even without accepting this evidence, examining it should be a priority.
Also under-addressed by the Taskforce are concerns that nuclear presents: unresolved eye-wateringly expensive radioactive waste challenges20; extraordinary vulnerabilities to climate-driven sea-level rise21; and highly concentrated pre-distributed iconic targets for enemies in times of war22. Again, conclusions may vary, but – unless the aim is simply to force through a manifestly unfavourable option – why not at least look at such issues?
Perhaps most disturbing of all is the wider context. This failure by the Taskforce even to attempt duly detailed comparative analysis is also a feature of high-profile official UK analysis for many years. Again, neither the Taskforce, nor the UK Government now enthusiastically taking up its prescriptions23, make any reference to any official attempt to compare nuclear power with its alternatives. This remarkable blind spot means current deregulatory action is seriously under-substantiated.
In the one area where the Taskforce does address issues of risk, neglect for rigorous assessment comes even more to the fore. In particular, critical attention is given to the long-established international ALARP principle24 – the requirement that risks be reduced “as low as reasonably practicable”. Here, without making underlying evidence readily checkable, the Review simply asserts current interpretations of nuclear risks to be “overly cautious25”.
But ALARP has evolved over many decades26 precisely because nuclear activities can involve severe and long-lasting consequences. Far from being “overly cautious”, a general pattern is for risks that were initially denied to eventually be acknowledged by events27.
So, any move to weaken ALARP inevitably raises questions about trade-offs. Faster approvals, lower costs and greater flexibility may all be desirable goals on their own. Yet it is difficult to see how significant regulatory changes can occur without affecting the balance currently struck between efficiency and protection.
It makes no reference to any official attempt to compare nuclear power with its alternatives. This remarkable blind spot means current deregulatory action is seriously under-substantiated.
Oddly, these trade-offs are also rarely discussed in detail by the Taskforce. And in the ensuing King’s Speech28, they are explicitly framed as a “win-win”. So, it is not so much that a case is made as to why relaxing nuclear regulation will incur benefits greater than risks. The unsupported claim is even stronger: that negative trade-offs effectively don’t exist. Given both the history of nuclear technologies29 and the current world situation30, this again seems an eccentric position to assert without evidence.
All this matters still more, because the Taskforce recommendations now being acted on are not modest adjustments. The Taskforce itself repeatedly calls for “radical reform” and a “radical reset” of the regulatory system31. Keir Starmer put it even more strongly in claiming that his “Government rips up rules to fire-up nuclear power”32. There is no suggestion of any change of direction by Andy Burnham. Yet if the existing nuclear regulatory system is as genuinely well respected as is claimed, why is radical change necessary at all? If radical change is necessary, what exactly is wrong with the current arrangements? Does this contradiction not also suggest rhetoric more than substance?
A further striking feature of the Review is its lack of historical perspective. For nearly two decades, successive UK governments have sought to streamline planning, nuclear licensing and approval procedures33. New institutions have been created. Planning procedures have been reconfigured34. Regulatory processes have been accelerated. Yet despite all this, nuclear projects remain slow, costly and difficult to deliver35.
Before proposing another round of deregulation, then, it seems reasonable to ask why previous attempts failed. Was regulation really the main obstacle? What are the implications if the key difficulties lie in the economics and engineering of nuclear technologies themselves36? What if – like so many technologies before – nuclear power is simply becoming obsolete?37
If there were no alternatives38, the Taskforce’s blinkered focus on nuclear alone might be understandable. But in the UK, as worldwide39, the main story is – again under any view – the phenomenally rapid overtaking of nuclear power by other domestic, secure, zero carbon technologies40. If the Taskforce were to be true to its stated principles of proportionality, efficiency and affordability, surely it would have something to say about this?
Perhaps the most important issue, then, concerns democratic accountability.41 Treating the case for nuclear technologies as ‘given’ diverts attention from the actual pros and cons of nuclear activities to how best they should be regulated. In this, safety problems are not directly denied but implied to be insufficient to outweigh “the UK’s nuclear ambitions”.
Was regulation really the main obstacle? What are the implications if the key difficulties lie in the economics and engineering of nuclear technologies themselves? What if – like so many technologies before – nuclear power is simply becoming obsolete?
What then are the drivers of these ambitions? The Review itself and associated Kings Speech confirm the deep entangling of civil and military nuclear infrastructures. So – albeit not asked officially – the question reasonably arises as to whether the flows of resources from mixed civil and military budgets (as funded by taxpayers or electricity consumers) match the patterns of costs as actually incurred on civil and military sides. Or is there a mismatch that leads one side to gain disproportionately by the sharing of resources? Cui bono?
When this oddly-neglected question was actually addressed by a study in 2024 for a UK Foreign Office-funded research programme, the answer was clear. The study drew on officially stated budgets of government civil and military nuclear-related agencies and programmes and on flows of revenues from consumers for purchase of excessively expensive wholesale nuclear electricity – that would cost less, according to Government data, if alternative zero carbon sources were used. Even when calculated in a conservative way – that diminishes the size of the observed imbalance – this provisional study found a net flow of value from civil to military nuclear infrastructures amounting to more than £5 billion per year42.
In the absence of officially audited figures, this kind of external analysis is all there is in the UK at the moment. Although the Government itself is silent on the matter, it seems clear who benefits from the emphasised integration of civil and military nuclear industrial base. And this corroborates the openly stated position in defence documents discussed earlier in this briefing. The reason for UK perseverance with unnecessarily expensive and otherwise substitutable nuclear power seems largely to reflect military pressures43.
Whatever side they are viewed from, the implications are very serious. The declared costs of the UK nuclear-propelled submarine programme are already questioned even by advocates44. Without this massive cross-subsidy, it is clear these burdens would become even more unaffordable45. So it is evidently for this reason that the Taskforce asserts nuclear technologies to be “essential” for the UK. This seems why the Taskforce links a “high-performing national nuclear enterprise” so strongly to defence objectives.
This picture is reinforced by the provisions of the King’s Speech. Accepting in principle all 47 recommendations of the Nuclear Taskforce, the King’s Speech was even more clear in expressing the remarkable intensity of commitment that exists in UK policy for sustaining a combined civil-military nuclear complex. The Nuclear Regulation Bill itself is explicitly justified as speeding nuclear delivery and reducing costs “in a boost to the UK’s energy sovereignty and the nuclear deterrent”.46
In conclusion, the key point applies even though reasonable people may disagree about the morality, wisdom and efficacy of nuclear weapons as well as about the pros and cons of any future role for nuclear power. Under any view, such disagreements should surely be addressed openly? It is here that both the Taskforce Report, and the wider grounds for current policies being implemented on this basis, might be seen from all sides as problematic.
The core issue is not whether nuclear regulation should change, or how. It is whether proposals for the present “radical reset” are supported by analysis that is sufficiently rigorous, balanced and transparent47 to justify the profound consequences that may follow for UK electricity consumers, taxpayers and citizens in the widest sense. On that question, important doubts remain.
1. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-kings-speech-2026
3. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nuclear-regulatory-taskforce
6. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2214629618313501
8. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2214629618313501
9. https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/96159/1/608_15_Global_Nuclear.pdf
11. https://web.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/Articles/I/CombiningRenew/100PercentPaperAbstracts.pdf
13. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41560-020-00696-3
14. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9837910
17. https://www.gov.scot/publications/foi-202400420100/
18. https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/443677/atoms-and-ashes-by-plokhy-serhii/9780141997179
20. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/oct/23/sellafield-cleanup-cost-136bn-national-audit-office
21. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211467X24000725
23. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/overhaul-of-nuclear-system-to-speed-up-building-and-cut-costs
24. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0951832011000238
26. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00223131.2018.1551814
29. https://www.ucs.org/resources/brief-history-nuclear-accidents-worldwide
32. UK Government press release 2/25: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-rips-up-rules-to-fire-up-nuclear-power
33. https://cms.law/en/cze/legal-updates/john-hutton-sets-action-plan-for-nuclear-new-build
36. https://www.sgr.org.uk/resources/nuclear-power-and-net-zero-too-little-too-late-too-expensive
39. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz947djd3d3o
40. https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/wnisr2025-v2.pdf
41. https://www.spokesmanbooks.com/Spokesman/PDF/150Stirling.pdf
44. https://www.ft.com/content/e1d82f18-0555-445b-b595-72c54d1dc940?syn-25a6b1a6=1
