President Trump’s demands on Denmark for Greenland and his insistence that he will take it by hook or by crook represent a new level of crisis for the Transatlantic alliance. It is a point at which the alliance could have broken-down, potentially changing the outcome of the war in Ukraine and forcing decisions on the future of the EU on its member states that would be as unwelcome to them as to the UK.
What is certain is that, despite the evidence and experience that the US is strongest within its alliances, it is the Europeans who would have felt the chill of this Arctic storm most. US security in the short term would be unlikely to change much; that of Europe would be hazarded.
The Greenland claim has been in the wings a while – though there was no mention of it in the National Security Strategy; perhaps the President’s inaction over Iran has pushed him into exertion closer to home.
Europe’s response was the worst of all world’s – an attempt to defend Greenland from the US under the guise of securing it against China and Russia. No element of this had any credibility. It antagonised the President: it did not reassure. No doubt it will be misinterpreted by Brussels.
If President Trump is feeling threatened by the lack of security in the Arctic, and Greenland in particular, and this is not without reason, then addressing that perceived threat as well as the real threat is all important.
European states’ ability to deploy warfighting combat units has decayed since the end of the Cold War to levels that will be hard to recover from. Though the public discourse has been that the US has been pulling out of the defence of continental Europe post-1989, peace dividend and then to resource warfighting and peace-making in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as to make its preparation for a confrontation with China, it is Europe that has actually abandoned European defence. Blaming the US fails the test of the evidence of spending and capability and how those relate to the direct threat to NATO’s European members.
Even in 2014 when Russia seized Crimea and parts of Donbas, and in 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine, Europe did not rearm. What forced its hand was the February 2025 Trump-Putin call. Germany, which once fielded heavy combat forces on NATO’s central front, had all but abandoned the idea of warfighting. The UK has let its army decline even further since 2014; it remains underfunded across all its arms and is currently able to field about a brigade, though probably not sustain that over time. The Royal Navy is a shell of its nominal strength.
“If President Trump is feeling threatened by the lack of security in the Arctic, and Greenland in particular, and this is not without reason, then addressing that perceived threat as well as the real threat is all important.”
There has been a late awakening in 2025, not only to the security threat, but to our own neglect. Prior to 2022, as threat has grown, the UK actually reduced capability. That is a rare achievement. Since then and February 2025 we have prioritised public services and welfare but not defence. If Washington – not just the President – has given up on us, we have ourselves to blame.
Where do we go from here? Firstly, let’s stop pretending that we are currently addressing the gap between the threat we face and the resources we can deploy to meet it. We are nowhere close to doing this. We have under invested and recruited for decades. To catch up will require raising funds on the bond markets to address equipment funding gaps of upwards of £28bn – and they need to be met in the next few years, not over a decade. This probably means something around £25bn raised now and much of it spent on equipment based on urgent operational requirements, thus avoiding the procurement failures that haunt all major equipment programmes. The bond markets will buy – deterrence secures peace and peace is the pre-requisite for prosperity, theirs as well as the nation’s. The British state would be looking serious – at last. Recruitment needs addressing immediately, with the Serco contract made non-exclusive and the services recruiting again directly with new approaches and with other contractors involved too. Armed forces housing can be funded out of the extensive social housing funds Angela Rayner won and the MoD funding allocated for it moved to operational readiness and recruitment.
On the Arctic front, we need to step up with a security framework that secures and deters but does not threaten Russia. The NATO approach accepted by President Trump is the right way to go; getting the implementation right and sustaining it will be the challenge. The Arctic needs détente, based on deterrence, not an arms race. Denmark’s Joint Arctic Command is no longer a convincing deterrence against Russia or reassurance for the US. However real the threats may be from Russia, the perception of threat is the driver, and that is high in presidential circles, fuelled by a consistent history of European weakness and failure on defence over the last few decades. We are in no position to argue on this – the task is to address it properly. During the Cold War, a US-led NATO secured German, as well as wider European and North American security; if Germany accepted this not only in 1955 but even after 1989, then so too can Denmark as regards Greenland.
“Restoring UK defence capability means around £25bn should be raised now, and much of it spent on equipment procured as ‘urgent operational requirements’, thus avoiding the procurement failures that haunt all major equipment programmes.”
To make it credible, a NATO operational command, perhaps under Norfolk Virgina, should be established with key assets developed – airbases in Northern Norway and Iceland enhanced, with RAF squadrons moved north to these new bases. A maritime force, based on Royal Navy, Norwegian, Canadian and Danish naval assets, at the heart of which should be Royal Navy aircraft carriers and subs, would provide further deterrence. Securing this region of the Arctic, and thus the trans-Atlantic alliance, are the best use of these assets; conveniently based near the UK, they would be operationally sustainable even now, while basing is improved and equipment shortfalls and maintenance backlogs addressed. The Royal Marines, already trained for northern Norway, should be enhanced – that means more recruitment and kit – with HMS Bulwark – if it is not too late – returned to Royal Navy service immediately, demonstrating UK commitment is real.
In terms of allies and command, it would be preferable to offer the US command of Arctic NATO command or under that of the UK. Germany and France have enough on their hands in central Europe and perhaps, in time, the Med. There should be a push back against the EU’s Arctic strategy – the Arctic strategic area is essentially outside of the EU, and the EU has no ability to deploy anything substantial – even with an icebreaker. It provokes, without achieving anything real. The last thing that is needed is any more great power rivalry in the Arctic.
A UK focus within a Transatlantic NATO command fits our level of deployable resources as well as our own security needs – directly and indirectly. If we can make the US feel safe, and through investment and deployment address deeply held US assessments of the UK’s reliability – assessments that are sadly far more accurate than the glossy brochures that pass as UK command papers – then we can rescue the security of the North Atlantic and the Transatlantic and special relationships from the peril they now face. No mean aim.
Sir Keir Starmer has played a good game with President Trump. That game has reached its limits. Now is the time to end that game and put resources on the table and commit them to US as well as continental security. A substantial move now, backed by investment, gives us the best chance to keep the US in transatlantic security arrangements and the resources to make a modest but reliable contribution to the security of the continent. We too must be realistic; if we fail to keep the US in the alliance with an in-depth and funded strategy that convinces Washington that we are for real again, then we will be forced to pay out even more in the absence of US engagement. At present that US engagement is considerable across every realm of warfighting. Lose the US, and you can add another £50bn to that bill – and many hundreds of billions of euros – and still lack the power to deter war.
“If we can make the US feel safe, and through investment and deployment address deeply held US assessments of the UK’s reliability then we can rescue the security of the North Atlantic and the trans-Atlantic and special relationships from the peril they now face. No mean aim.”
The President needs assurance that we have his back and that he can sell this to the American people as a win for the US. The Arctic is the right domain for the UK to take the lead in deployments. We can cobble together deployable force even now as an Arctic taskforce that is credible in US eyes. We can build onto that the bases and allies that will provide deterrence and security for the US, Denmark/Greenland, ourselves, the Nordic countries – and have the back for continental Europe.
At the height of our naval power we were concerned with the North Sea, the Atlantic and Arctic to the exclusion of pretty much all else. This is a familiar role for us. We can afford, if we fund the equipment gap, to do this well and sustain it over time. It is the best contribution that we can make to Western security, stability and deterrence – and thus our prosperity. It would cement Sir Keir Starmer’s Labour Party as the true party of Government and give the UK a role that is equal to its global reputation and history but credibly within our resources.
